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INTRODUCTION  
 
“It’s not easy for me to raise my hand and send off a boy to die 
 without talking about it first.”1 
 
The death penalty has been used as a form of criminal punishment 
since the beginning of civilization,
2
 and has existed in the United 
States since the founding of the original colonies.
3
 In its early days, the 
death penalty was used for a variety of crimes, including murder, 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2016, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW Executive Articles Editor, 2015–16; B.S. 
in Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, December 2009.  
1
12 ANGRY MEN (Reginald Rose, et. al. 1957). 
2
 The first established death penalty laws were codified in the Code of King 
Hammaurabi of Babylon in the eighteenth century B.C. History of the Death 
Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty#america (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2015). 
3
 Origins of Capital Punishment, CRIME MUSEUM, 
http://www.crimemuseum.org/crime-library/origins-of-capital-punishment (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2015).  
1
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burglary, treason, counterfeiting, and arson.
4
 This use was limited, 
however, by the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791.
5
 Indeed, the 
Eighth Amendment of the Bill of Rights prohibits the infliction of 
“cruel and unusual punishment.”6 Thus, the punishment must be 
proportional to the crime committed.
7
 Accordingly, today, the death 
penalty is imposed predominantly for the crime of murder,
8
 with the 
view being that the punishment of death “fits the crime” of murder—
an “eye for an eye” if you will. 
Over 3000 inmates currently sit on death row in the United 
States.
9
 Sixty-two (62) of these inmates await execution on federal 
death row
10
 in Terre Haute, Indiana.
11
 Among these inmates is a man 
by the name of Bruce Webster.
12
 Webster has been housed in Terre 
Haute since 1996, following his conviction in the Northern District of 
Texas for the federal crimes of kidnapping resulting in death, 
                                                 
4
 Id. 
5
 America’s Tug of War over Sanctioned Death: The U.S. History of Capital 
Punishment, Random History (Sept. 19, 2009), 
http://www.randomhistory.com/2009/09/19_capital-punishment.html.  
6
 Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
7
 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (quoting Weems v. 
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)) (“The Eighth Amendment’s protection 
against excessive or cruel and unusual punishment flows from the basic precept of 
justice that punishment for a crime should be graduated and proportioned to the 
offense.”). 
8
 Death Penalty for Offenses Other than Murder, Death Penalty Information 
Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-offenses-other-murder (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2015). Although capital offenses exist in several states for various 
other types of crimes, no one is currently on death row for these crimes. Id. 
9
 Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year 
(last visited Sept. 13, 2015).  
10
 Federal Death Row Prisoners, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER 
(June 26, 2015), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-row-prisoners.  
11
 The federal correctional facility in Terre Haute is currently “the only federal 
facility which can carry out executions.” Jon Swaner, Why Tsarnaev Was Not Sent to 
Terre Haute, WTHI, June 26, 2015, http://wthitv.com/2015/06/26/why-tsarnaev-
was-not-sent-to-terre-haute/.  
12
 Federal Death Row Prisoners, supra note 10. 
2
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conspiring to commit kidnapping, and using and carrying a firearm 
during a crime of violence.
13
 He was sentenced to death on the first 
count (kidnapping resulting in death) after the district court dismissed 
the argument that he was ineligible for the death penalty because he 
suffers from an intellectual disability.
14
 On direct appeal, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed Webster’s death 
sentence.
15
 Several years later, the Fifth Circuit rejected Webster’s 
motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
16
 as well 
as his request for a second collateral review under this same statute.
17
 
Webster then filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Seventh Circuit 
pursuant to the Savings Clause of Section 2255.
18
 
The Savings Clause has been and continues to be a constant 
“source of litigation” in federal courts,19 and was at the heart of 
Webster’s plea before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit. Section 2255 allows for a federal prisoner to vacate his 
sentence if it “was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of 
the United States.”20 As a general rule, the remedy afforded by Section 
2255 functions as a substitute for the writ of habeas corpus.
21
 
                                                 
13
 Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1124 (7th Cir. 2015).  
14
 Id. at 1124–25. The governing statute at the time was 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c), 
which makes it unlawful to impose a sentence of death upon a person who is 
mentally retarded (now termed “intellectually disability” by the Supreme Court). See 
Hall v. Florida., 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014). 
15
 United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 351 (5th Cir. 1998). 
16
 United States v. Webster, 421 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2005). 
17
 In re Webster, 605 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2010). 
18
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1135. 
19
 Nicolas Matterson, Feeling Inadequate?: The Struggle to Define the Savings 
Clause in 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 54 B.C. L. REV. 353, 355 (2013). 
20
 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 
21
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1124. “A writ of habeas corpus is a court order that 
commands an individual or government official, usually a prison warden, who has 
restrained another to produce the prisoner at a designated time and place so that the 
court can determine the legality of custody and decide whether to order the 
prisoner’s release.” Habeas Corpus, THE FREE DICTIONARY, 
http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/writ+of+habeas+corpus (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2015). 
3
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However, Congress has recognized that there might be cases in which 
the remedy provided by Section 2255 “is inadequate or ineffective to 
test the legality of the [prisoner’s] detention,”22 and has, accordingly, 
authorized the filing of a traditional writ of habeas corpus under 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 in these rare circumstances.
23
 In Webster v. Daniels, the 
Seventh Circuit recognized that Bruce Webster had presented such a 
rare case, due largely to the fact that he seeks to offer “newly 
discovered” evidence that may demonstrate that he was diagnosed as 
intellectually disabled before his arrest and subsequent sentencing.
24
 
As a result of this decision, Webster could have the opportunity to 
challenge his death sentence yet again.
25
 
This article will analyze the soundness of the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision to allow Bruce Webster to file a writ of habeas corpus 
attacking his death sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Part I of 
this article discusses the federal statutes at issue in Webster v. Daniels: 
28 U.S.C. § 2255 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Part II analyzes the factual 
and procedural background of Webster v. Daniels. Part III then 
examines the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Webster v. Daniels as well 
as prior Seventh Circuit cases that address the application of the 
Savings Clause. Finally, Part IV considers the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Webster v. Daniels, and argues that this decision, though 
commendable in principle, was not supported by prior case law or 
sufficient legal justification and is contrary to public policy.  
 
STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
 
To fully understand Webster v. Daniels, a brief overview of 
federal habeas corpus law is required, specifically Section 2255, since 
the conclusion reached in this case turns on the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation of this provision. Accordingly, this first Part provides a 
brief history of the writ of habeas corpus, leading to the enactment of 
                                                 
22
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1124; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). 
23
 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). 
24
 See Webster, 784 F.3d at 1142–44. 
25
 See id. at 1146.  
4
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28 U.S.C. § 2255. It will also discuss the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 
2255, with a focus on the Savings Clause.  
 
A. History of Federal Habeas Corpus Review 
 
Habeas corpus is a Latin phrase meaning “to produce the body.”26 
Thus, the function of a writ of habeas corpus, often referred to as the 
“Great Writ,”27 is to bring a prisoner before the court to determine the 
legality of the incarceration or detention.
28
 It is most often invoked 
after conviction and after the exhaustion of direct appeal; it is often a 
last resort for prisoners seeking relief.
29
 The writ of habeas corpus was 
developed in England during the thirteenth century, and was later 
brought to the colonies, and incorporated into the U.S. Constitution.
30
 
The Suspension Clause, contained in Article I of the Constitution, 
provides that “the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless 
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety shall require 
it.”31  
This common law right to habeas corpus was codified for the first 
time in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,
32
 and is currently codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 2241.
33
 Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to grant 
writs of habeas corpus “when any person is restrained of his or her 
liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the 
                                                 
26
 Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. 
L. REV. 443, 446 (2007). 
27
 See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). 
28
 Kovarsky, supra note 26, at 446. 
29
 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33391, FEDERAL HABEAS 
CORPUS: A BRIEF LEGAL OVERVIEW 1 (2006). 
30
 Jennifer L. Case, Note, Text Me: A Text-Based Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 
2255(e), 103 KY. L.J. 169, 171–72. (2014). 
31
 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2. 
32
 Case, supra note 30, at 173.  
33
 Jennifer L. Case, Kaleidoscopic Chaos: Understanding the Circuit Courts’ 
Various Interpretations of § 2255’s Savings Clause, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 9 (2014).  
5
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United States.”34 This statute provided prisoners with federal habeas 
corpus relief for well over a century.
35
 However, the filing 
requirements of the Act eventually became problematic.
36
 
The Habeas Corpus Act required a prisoner to file his or her writ 
of habeas corpus in the district of the prisoner’s incarceration.37 This 
requirement created two main problems.
38
 First, those federal districts 
with large concentrations of federal prisons were required to handle an 
inordinate number of habeas corpus petitions.
39
 Second, because 
habeas courts were “often far from the sentencing court, prisoners had 
limited access to relevant records, witnesses, and evidence.”40 To 
remedy these problems, Congress proposed new legislation that 
required federal prisoners to challenge their convictions in the court 
that sentenced them, rather than the court with jurisdiction over their 
confinement.
41
 This legislation, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255, was 
enacted in 1948.
42
 
 
B.  28 U.S.C. § 2255 and the Savings Clause 
 
Section 2255 allows a federal prisoner to move “to vacate, set 
aside, or correct” a federal sentence if “the sentence was imposed in 
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.”43 A federal 
prisoner can also use a Section 2255 motion to argue that: (1) the 
sentencing court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (2) 
                                                 
34
 Case, supra note 30, at 173 (citing Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 
14 Stat. 385, 385–86). 
35
 Id. at 174 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave et. al., Criminal Procedure §28.2(b) 
(3d. ed. 2013)). 
36
 Id. at 175. 
37
 United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213 (1952). 
38
 Case, supra note 30, at 175. 
39
 Id.  
40
 Id. at 175–76. 
41
 Matteson, supra note 19, at 358–59 (2013) (citing Hayman, 342 U.S. at 213–
14). 
42
 Id. at 359. 
43
 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 
6
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the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law; or, (3) 
the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack.
44
  
Section 2255 effectively replaced the traditional writ of habeas 
corpus provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2241 as the means for a federal 
prisoner to challenge a federal criminal sentence.
45
 In fact, Section 
2255 goes so far as to prohibit federal courts from hearing Section 
2241 petitions filed by federal prisoners.
46
 Indeed, the relevant 
language of the statute provides that “an application for a writ of 
habeas corpus on behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for 
relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it 
appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to 
the court which sentenced him.”47 
Section 2255 enables federal prisoners to bring an initial motion 
as a matter of right.
48
 However, Congress has limited the opportunity 
for successive relief under Section 2255 as a result of the societal 
interest in the finality of judicial decisions.
49
 Therefore, prisoners 
seeking to bring a second or successive motion pursuant to Section 
2255 must satisfy stringent standards before the motion may be 
heard.
50
 Section 2255(h) first requires the prisoner to petition the 
appropriate court of appeals
51
 for an order authorizing the district court 
to consider the successive motion.
52
 A three-judge panel of the court of 
appeals then hears this petition.
53
 The court of appeals may authorize 
the filing of a second or successive motion if it contains:  
                                                 
44
 Case, supra note 30, at 177 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255).   
45
 Lauren Staley, Note, Inadequate and Ineffective? Factual Innocence and the 
Savings Clause of § 2255, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1149, 1151 (2013) (quoting Wayne R. 
LaFave et. al., Criminal Procedure §28.9(a) (3d. ed. 2013)). 
46
 Case, supra note 33, at 12–13.  
47
 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).  
48
 See Case, supra note 33, at 14. 
49
 See Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2013).  
50
 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). 
51
 In other words, the court of appeals with jurisdiction over the sentencing 
court.  
52
 28 U.S.C. § 2244(3)(A).  
53
 Id. § 2244(3)(B).  
7
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(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in 
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable 
factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; 
or  
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases 
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was 
previously unavailable.
54
  
 
Simply put, if a successive Section 2255 motion fails to introduce 
either new evidence demonstrating innocence of the underlying crime 
or a new rule of constitutional law previously unavailable to the 
prisoner, a court of appeals will not certify the petition.
55
 As a result, 
successive collateral review will be barred, unless the Savings Clause 
applies.
56
  
The Savings Clause, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), allows 
federal prisoners to file a traditional habeas corpus petition in the 
district of incarceration pursuant to Section 2241.
57
 However, the 
Savings Clause only applies when the remedy provided by Section 
2255(a) is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the 
detention.”58 This provision is often relied upon in cases where the 
prisoner filed an unsuccessful motion under Secion 2255(a), and then 
was denied the opportunity to file a successive motion pursuant to 
Section 2255(h), leaving the Savings Clause as the only means 
available to obtain review of a sentence that may be unconstitutional 
or illegal.
59
 The application of the Savings Clause in such 
                                                 
54
 Id. § 2255(h).  
55
 Staley, supra note 45, at 1152. The grant or denial of an authorization to file 
a successive Section 2255 motion is not appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(3)(E).  
56
 Staley, supra note 45, at 1152.  
57
 Case, supra note 33, at 14. 
58
 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). 
59
 Matteson, supra note 19, at 362. 
8
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circumstances is frequently litigated,
60
 and it is the source of the 
dispute among the Seventh Circuit judges in Webster v. Daniels.  
 
CASE BACKGROUND 
 
It is necessary to understand the facts and procedural history of 
Webster v. Daniels in order to understand the Seventh Circuit’s holding 
in this case. Accordingly, this Part will set forth the facts, detailing the 
crimes committed by Webster that ultimately led to his conviction in 
the Northern District of Texas. It will also briefly discuss the case’s 
disposition in the Texas district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit prior to the collateral attack in the Seventh Circuit. 
 
A.  Factual Background 
 
Webster, along with his accomplices Orlando Hall and Marvin 
Holloway, ran a drug ring in Pine Bluff, Arkansas in the early 1990s.
61
 
The group purchased marijuana in the Dallas/Fort Worth area with the 
help of a local contact, Steven Beckley, and transported it back to 
Arkansas to sell.
62
 
On September 21, 1994, Hall flew to Dallas to participate in a 
drug transaction.
63
 In Dallas, Hall and his local contact, Beckley, met 
two local drug dealers, Stanford Vitalis and Neil Rene, at a car wash 
and gave them $4,700 as an advance payment for marijuana.
64
 Vitalis 
and Rene stated that they would return to the car wash later that day 
with the marijuana, but they never appeared.
65
 Vitalis and Rene 
claimed that the money and the car they had been driving were 
stolen.
66
 Hall was suspicious of this story, so he, along with his 
                                                 
60
 Id. at 355.  
61
 Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1125 (7th Cir. 2015).  
62
 United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 317 (5th Cir. 1998).  
63
 Id.  
64
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1125.  
65
 Id.  
66
 Id. 
9
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brother, Demetrious, and Beckley, began to survey Vitalis and Rene’s 
apartment.
67
 When they later saw Vitalis and Rene in the supposedly 
stolen vehicle, they deduced that the story about the stolen money was 
also false.
68
 
On September 24, 1994, Hall arranged for Webster to fly to 
Dallas.
69
 That night, Hall, Demetrious, Beckley, and Webster went to 
Vitalis and Rene’s apartment in a vehicle owned by Hall’s sister.70 The 
group approached the apartment and knocked on the door.
71
 The 
occupant, Lisa Rene (the sixteen-year old sister of Neil Rene), refused 
to let them in.
72
 Webster then forcibly entered the apartment, grabbed 
Lisa, and dragged her to the car.
73
 Webster forced Lisa onto the 
floorboard of the car, and the group drove to Hall’s sister’s apartment 
nearby.
74
 Once there, they forced Lisa into Beckley’s car and drove 
around looking for a secluded spot.
75
 During the drive, Hall raped Lisa 
and forced her to perform fellatio on him.
76
 
Beckley, Demetrious, and Webster eventually decided to drive 
Lisa back to Pine Bluff, Arkansas.
77
 Webster and Demetrious took 
turns raping Lisa on the way there.
78
 Once they arrived in Pine Bluff, 
the men rented a motel room, where they tied Lisa to a chair and 
continued to sexually assault her.
79
 
                                                 
67
 Id. 
68
 Id.  
69
 Id.  
70
 Id.  
71
 United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 318 (5th Cir. 1998). 
72
 Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1126 (7th Cir. 2015). 
73
 Id.  
74
 Id.  
75
 Id.  
76
 United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 318 (5th Cir. 1998). 
77
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1126. 
78
 Id.  
79
 Id.  
10
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The next day, Hall and Holloway arrived at the motel.
80
 They 
decided that Lisa “knew too much.”81 Later that afternoon, Hall and 
Webster went to a nearby park, and dug a grave.
82
 Webster, Hall, and 
Beckley took Lisa to the park the next morning.
83
 They covered her 
eyes with a mask, and led her to the grave site.
84
 At the grave site, Hall 
turned Lisa’s back to the grave, placed a sheet over her head, and then 
hit her in the head with a shovel.
85
 Lisa screamed and tried to run 
away, but Beckley grabbed her and hit her in the head twice with the 
shovel.
86
 Webster and Hall then took turns hitting her with the 
shovel.
87
 Webster then gagged her, dragged her to the grave, stripped 
her, poured gasoline on her, and shoveled dirt over her.
88
 Shortly 
thereafter, Hall, Demetrious, Beckley and Webster were arrested for 
this horrific crime.
89
 
 
B.  Procedural History 
 
Webster was convicted in the Northern District of Texas on 
charges of kidnapping in which death occurred, conspiracy to commit 
kidnapping, and using and carrying a firearm during a crime of 
violence.
90
 He was sentenced to death on the first count.
91
 
                                                 
80
 Id.  
81
 Id.  
82
 Id.  
83
 Id. 
84
 Id.  
85
 Id.  
86
 United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 319 (5th Cir. 1998). 
87
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1126.  
88
 Id.  
89
 Id.  
90
 Id. at 1126–27. 
91
 Id. at 1127. 
11
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Webster challenged this sentence, arguing that he was ineligible 
for the death penalty under 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c)
92
 because he suffers 
from an intellectual disability.
93
 Webster relied on the testimony of 
three expert psychologists to support this argument.
94
 These three 
experts maintained that a finding of mental retardation is appropriate if 
the person’s I.Q. is roughly 70 or below and if the person has a deficit 
in at least one of the three areas of adaptive functioning 
(communication, socialization, and daily living skills).
95
 All three 
testified that Webster suffered from a low I.Q. (with scores on I.Q. 
tests
96
 ranging from 59 to 65)
97
 and had the adaptive functioning of a 
six to seven-year old.
98
  
To rebut this testimony, the government offered two of its own 
experts, who testified that Webster achieved a score of 72 on a 
truncated version of the I.Q. test performed by the government
99
 and 
that Webster had satisfactory adaptive functioning.
100
 The government 
also suggested that Webster may have lied or otherwise manipulated 
the tests performed by his experts in order to establish that he was 
ineligible for the death penalty.
101
  
 This conflicting evidence clearly created a question of fact, and 
the district court, weighing this evidence, concluded that Webster was 
not intellectually disabled, and, therefore, he was not exempt from the 
                                                 
92
 18 U.S.C. § 3956(c) provides that “a sentence of death shall not be carried 
out upon a person who is mentally retarded, or a person who lacks the mental 
capacity to understand the death penalty due to mental disability.” 
93
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1132. 
94
 Id. at 1127. 
95
 Id. 
96
 These experts administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) 
Test. Id. at 1128. This test is widely used to test I.Q and assesses both verbal and 
performance skills. Id.  
97
 Id. at 1128.  
98
 Id. at 1129. 
99
 Id. at 1130. 
100
 Id. at 1131. 
101
 Id. at 1128. 
12
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implementation of the death penalty under 28 U.S.C. § 3596(c).
102
 
Webster immediately filed an appeal, but his death sentence was 
affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
103
  
In 2005, six years after Webster was sentenced, the U.S. Supreme 
Court, in Atkins v. Virginia, held that the Eighth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution—not just federal statutory law—prohibits 
the execution of the intellectually disabled.
104
 Even though the trial 
court had previously determined that Webster was not intellectual 
disabled, Webster nevertheless filed a motion to vacate his death 
sentence in light of Atkins.
105
 In this motion, brought pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2255, Webster argued that his sentence was imposed in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
106
 This argument was rejected by 
the Fifth Circuit, which held that Webster failed to establish that he 
suffered from an intellectual disability at trial and that, accordingly, 
the imposition of the death penalty by the trial court was proper, 
regardless of the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins.107 
Following this decision, “nothing of legal significance happened 
in Webster’s case for four years.”108 In 2009, though, Webster returned 
to the Fifth Circuit and, with the aid of new counsel, again attempted 
to get his sentence vacated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
109
 With this 
second Section 2255 motion, Webster sought to introduce newly 
discovered evidence purportedly revealing that he had been diagnosed 
as intellectually disabled a year before the commission of the crimes 
for which he was convicted.
110
 His motion for certification was denied 
                                                 
102
 Id. at 1131. 
103
 Id.  
104
 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the execution of 
mentally retarded criminals constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment).  
105
 United States v. Webster, 421 F.3d 308, 310–11 (5th Cir. 2005). 
106
 Id. 
107
 Id. at 313. 
108
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1132. 
109
 Id. 
110
 Id. at 1133. 
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by the Fifth Circuit, which held that Webster’s proposed new evidence 
“did not meet the stringent standards imposed by Section 2255(h)” for 
successive motions.
111
 The Fifth Circuit first concluded that Section 
2255(h)(1) was not applicable because it requires the prisoner to 
present evidence that he could not be found guilty of the underlying 
offense.
112
 However, Webster did not seek to offer evidence of his 
innocence; rather, he sought to challenge his sentence.
113
 The Fifth 
Circuit also concluded that Section 2255(h)(2) was inapplicable 
because it requires a new rule of constitutional law that was previously 
unavailable, and Atkins had already been decided at the time of 
Webster’s initial Section 2255 motion.114 
When certification of his successive Section 2255 petition was 
denied, Webster filed a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
2241 in the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, where 
Webster then currently resided on death row in Terre Haute.
115
 Webster 
argued that he was permitted to bring a traditional habeas corpus 
petition under Section 2255(e).
116
 Section 2255(e)—or the “Savings 
Clause”—allows federal prisoners to file a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus when the remedy provided by Section 2255 is “inadequate or 
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”117 The district court 
found that Webster did not qualify for relief under the Savings Clause 
on the basis that the Clause applies only to changes in the law, not to 
new or additional facts.
118
 Webster appealed the district court’s denial 
of his habeas corpus petition to the Seventh Circuit.
119
 A panel of the 
                                                 
111
 Id. at 1134. 
112
 Id.  
113
 Id. 
114
 Id. 
115
 Id. at 1135. “The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to 
file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the 
subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.” 28 U.S.C. § 
2244(b)(3)(E).  
116
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1135.  
117
 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); see also Matteson, supra note 19, at 359. 
118
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1135. 
119
 Id.  
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the denial of 
Webster’s Section 2241 petition de novo.120 The panel affirmed the 
district court decision, concluding that new evidence can never satisfy 
Section 2255(e).
121
 However, the full court vacated that decision and 
reheard the case en banc.
122
 This decision led to the controversial 
opinion that is the subject of this article. 
 
DISCUSSION OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S OPINION IN  
WEBSTER V. DANIELS 
 
This Part will discuss Seventh Circuit case law interpreting the 
Savings Clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. This Part will then examine the 
majority opinion, with a focus on how the majority interpreted and 
applied the Savings Clause in Webster v. Daniels. Finally, this Part will 
consider the dissenting opinion in Webster v. Daniels.  
 
A.  Prior Seventh Circuit Interpretations of the Savings Clause 
 
The Savings Clause allows a federal prisoner to file a habeas 
corpus petition under Section 2241 when the remedy provided by 
Section 2255 “is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his 
detention.”123 Interestingly, the Supreme Court has never interpreted 
this Clause, despite ambiguity as to the meaning of the terms 
“inadequate” or “ineffective.”124 As a result, the circuit courts have 
developed different methodologies for determining whether the 
Savings Clause allows a prisoner to seek collateral review under 
Section 2241.
125
  
                                                 
120
 See Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hill v. 
Werlinger, 695 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2012)).  
121
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1125.  
122
 Id.  
123
 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).  
124
 Taylor v. Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 2002).  
125
 Case, supra note 33, at 15.  
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The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation is best understood by 
reviewing its noteworthy decisions. The first of these decisions as well 
as the one providing the most comprehensive discussion of the 
Savings Clause is In Re Davenport.
126
 In Davenport, a federal prisoner 
was convicted of the use of a firearm in the commission of a drug 
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because he was in possession of a 
firearm during the offense.
127
 After his conviction, Davenport sought 
relief under Section 2255.
128
 His request was denied.
129
 Shortly 
thereafter, the Supreme Court held that the “use” of a firearm within 
the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) did not include mere possession, as 
had been the law when Davenport was convicted.
130
 However, 
Davenport was barred from filing a successive motion under Section 
2255(h) because he was unable to present newly discovered evidence 
of innocence of the offense, or a new Supreme Court constitutional 
ruling.
131
 As a result, Davenport was prevented from challenging the 
legality of his sentence under Section 2255, even though the 
retroactive Supreme Court decision, if applied, could have proven that 
Davenport had not committed the crime for which he was 
convicted.
132
 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Section 
2255 provided an inadequate remedy and thereby allowed Davenport 
to bring a habeas corpus petition under Section 2241.
133
 This ruling 
provided Davenport with the opportunity to argue that his sentence 
was now improper in light of the Supreme Court’s new interpretation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
134
  
                                                 
126
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1135–36.   
127
 In Re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1998). 
128
 Id. 
129
 Id.  
130
 Id.  
131
 Id. at 610. 
132
 Id. 
133
 Id. at 610–12. 
134
 Id. 
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In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit established that 
three conditions must be present for the Savings Clause to apply.
135
 
First, the prisoner must show that he relies on a change in law that has 
recently been made retroactive by the Supreme Court, such that he 
could not have invoked this law as the basis for his initial Section 
2255 motion.
136
 Second, the change in law must be a change that 
“eludes the permission in Section 2255(h) for successive motions.”137 
In other words, the prisoner must show that he relies on a new or 
differing interpretation of a statute rather than a new interpretation of 
the Constitution.
138
 After all, if a new rule of constitutional law is 
made retroactive by the Supreme Court, then the prisoner would be 
able to initiate a successive Section 2255 motion under Section 
2255(h), and, thus, the remedy under Section 2255 would be 
adequate.
139
 Third, the prisoner must show “a fundamental defect in 
his conviction or sentence.”140 As a final point, the Seventh Circuit 
noted that the “change in law” cannot be the result of a difference in 
law between the circuit where the prisoner was sentenced and the 
circuit in which he is imprisoned.
141
 
The Seventh Circuit has applied these conditions in later cases to 
guide their Savings Clause analysis, with varied results.
142
 Cases that 
were decided in the wake of Davenport employed a narrow 
interpretation of the Savings Clause, limiting its application to those 
prisoners asserting claims of actual innocence.
143
 Indeed, the Seventh 
Circuit repeatedly stated that “§ 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only 
                                                 
135
 Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013).  
136
 Davenport, 719 F.3d at 611. 
137
 Id.  
138
 Brown, 719 F.3d at 586. 
139
 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). 
140
 Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611. 
141
 Id. at 612. 
142
 See Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015)  
143
 See Taylor v. Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2002); Unthank v. Jett, 
549 F.3d 534, 536 (7th Cir. 2008).  
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when a prisoner is unable to present a claim of actual innocence.”144 
By way of illustration, in Taylor v. Gilkey, the Seventh Circuit declined 
to apply the Savings Clause when a federal prisoner invoked it in an 
attempt to reduce his prison sentence.
145
 The prisoner in Taylor did not 
plead innocent of the underlying crime.
146
 Instead, he argued that his 
sentence was erroneously elevated as a result of ineffective assistance 
of counsel at trial.
147
 Similarly, in Unthank v. Jett, the Seventh Circuit 
dismissed a prisoner’s habeas petition under Section 2241 because the 
prisoner did not claim to be innocent of the actual crime; he merely 
claimed that the sentence imposed was too high.
148
 
However, in Brown v. Caraway, the Seventh Circuit shifted 
towards a broader interpretation of the Savings Clause.
149
 The federal 
prisoner in Brown was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 
cocaine and possession of a firearm by a felon.
150
 He was thereafter 
sentenced as a career offender in accordance with the sentencing 
guidelines.
151
 The prisoner initially challenged his sentence pursuant 
to Section 2255(a) on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.
152
 
After this motion was denied, the prisoner invoked the Savings Clause 
and filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
153
 The 
prisoner argued that he was entitled to a reduction in his sentence in 
light of a new Supreme Court decision, Begay v. United States, that 
called into question his classification as a career offender.
154
 
                                                 
144
 See, e.g., Taylor, 314 F.3d at 835; Unthank, 549 F.3d at 536.  
145
 314 F.3d at 834.  
146
 Id. at 836.  
147
 Id.  
148
 549 F.3d at 536.  
149
 See Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015) (describing 
Brown v. Caraway as a case where the Court applied a “broader understanding” of 
the Savings Clause). 
150
 Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 584 (7th. Cir. 2013). 
151
 Id.  
152
 Id.  
153
 Id.  
154
 Id.  
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In determining the applicability of the Savings Clause in Brown, 
the Seventh Circuit noted that “the text of the Clause focuses on the 
legality of the prisoner’s detention.”155 “It does not limit its scope to 
testing the legality of the underlying criminal conviction.”156 In other 
words, Savings Clause relief is not solely limited to prisoners asserting 
claims of actual innocence.
157
 Accordingly, a federal prisoner may 
“utilize the Savings Clause” to challenge the legality of his sentence, 
provided that he or she satisfies the conditions set forth by 
Davenport.
158
  
The Seventh Circuit ultimately found that these conditions were 
fulfilled, and, therefore, the court permitted the federal prisoner, 
Brown, to pursue traditional habeas relief under Section 2241.
159
 The 
first condition was satisfied because Brown relied on a statutory 
interpretation case to challenge the legality of his sentence, not a 
constitutional case.
160
 After all, Brown argued that he was entitled to a 
reduced sentence in light of Begay v. United States, a case that called 
into question the validity of his classification as a career offender 
under federal law—the very classification that led to his increased 
prison sentence in the first place.
161
 Brown also successfully 
demonstrated that he could not have relied on Begay in his initial 
Section 2255 motion because it had not been decided at the time his 
motion was heard, thereby satisfying Davenport’s second 
prerequisite.
162
 Lastly, the misapplication of the sentencing guidelines 
based on Brown’s unwarranted classification as a career offender 
                                                 
155
 Id. at 588.  
156
 Id.  
157
 Id.  
158
 Id.  
159
 Id. at 596.  
160
 Id. at 586. 
161
 Id. 
162
 Id.  
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yielded a “fundamental defect” in his sentence.163 In other words, his 
sentence was unjustly increased.
164
 
 
B.  The Majority Opinion in Webster v. Daniels 
 
The Seventh Circuit further expanded this complex body of case 
law with its recent decision in Webster v. Daniels. In Webster, a 
divided en banc court held that the Savings Clause permitted Webster 
to file a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
165
 The 
court, in an opinion authored by Chief Judge Wood, offered two 
reasons for its conclusion.  
The Seventh Circuit first relied on the language of 28 U.S.C. § 
2255 to support its holding.
166
 Section 2255 motions are available to 
federal prisoners “claiming the right to be released upon the ground 
that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws 
of the United States.”167 Thus, this statute allows federal prisoners to 
challenge the legality of a sentence on the basis of a flaw in the 
underlying conviction.
168
 It also allows federal prisoners to challenge a 
sentence that is unlawful “because of a constitutional or statutory rule 
pertaining to sentences.”169 The majority therefore contended that the 
Savings Clause, in the same vein, allows a federal prisoner to 
challenge the legality of his sentence (and not just his conviction) 
under Section 2241,
170
 a familiar holding initially set forth by the 
Seventh Circuit in Brown v. Caraway.
171
 According to the majority, the 
                                                 
163
 Id.  
164
 Id. at 587–88. 
165
 Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1138 (7th Cir. 2015).  
166
 Id. 
167
 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).  
168
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1138.  
169
 Id.  
170
 Id. 
171
 See Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2013).  
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language of the statute alone “leads directly to the result that the 
Savings Clause should apply here.”172 
Second, the majority reasoned that relief under the Savings Clause 
is appropriate in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. 
Virginia.
173
 Recall that in Atkins, the Supreme Court held that the 
Constitution prohibits the execution of mentally disabled persons.
174
 
Thus, according to the majority, an unconstitutional punishment will 
result if the Savings Clause does not apply.
175
 Indeed, Webster, an 
allegedly mentally challenged person, would be executed since his 
appeals have been exhausted. This is sufficient reason, in the 
majority’s opinion, to allow Webster the opportunity to file a Section 
2241 petition for habeas corpus relief.
176
  
Thus, with this decision, the majority established a new rule: that 
a federal prisoner may present newly discovered evidence pursuant to 
Section 2241 where the new evidence may reveal that the Constitution 
prohibits the penalty imposed upon the prisoner.
177
 However, the 
majority was quick to limit this rule, fearing that the implementation 
of a broad rule would eliminate any degree of finality in capital cases 
involving intellectually disabled persons.
178
 Accordingly, newly 
discovered evidence may be presented via Section 2241 only if: (1) the 
evidence existed before the time of the original trial; (2) the evidence 
was not available during the original trial despite diligent efforts by 
counsel; and (3) the evidence would purportedly show that the 
prisoner is constitutionally ineligible for the sentence he received.
179
 
The prisoner must make a prima facie showing of these three elements 
                                                 
172
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1139.  
173
 Id. at 1138. 
174
 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
175
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1139. 
176
 See id. at 1139. 
177
 Id. at 1140. 
178
 Id. 
179
 Id. at 1140–41; see also A New Route for Post-Conviction Sentencing 
Challenges, MILLER, SHAKMAN & BEEM (June 2015), http://millershakman.com/a-
new-route-for-post-conviction-sentencing-challenges/. 
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in order to proceed with a Section 2241 petition on the merits.
180
 If the 
prisoner successfully makes this showing, he may introduce the new 
evidence at a merits hearing.
181
 The government, in turn, will have the 
opportunity to refute this evidence and present its own.
182
 The 
prisoner, as the petitioner, bears the burden of proof; that burden being 
a preponderance of the evidence.
183
 It is then up to the district court to 
decide, as a matter of fact, whether the prisoner is constitutionally 
ineligible for the sentence in light of all the evidence.
184
 
The Seventh Circuit applied this new standard in Webster’s 
case.
185
 First, the court concluded that the evidence that Webster now 
seeks to offer would be used to prove that Webster is constitutionally 
ineligible for the death penalty on the basis of an intellectual 
disability.
186
 Second, this new evidence reveals that Webster was 
evaluated by the Social Security Administration and deemed “mentally 
retarded” by an Administration psychologist a year before the crime in 
question occurred.
187
 The evidence therefore existed before the time of 
trial. Finally, the court noted that, although the facts are disputed, there 
is evidence suggesting that these records were not available to Webster 
during the initial trial as a result of missteps by the Social Security 
Administration, not Webster’s counsel.188 Accordingly, the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that Webster was eligible under its new standard to 
seek relief under Section 2241 as a matter of law.
189
 
Whether or not Webster should be granted this relief as a matter of 
fact, however, is debatable. After all, the parties contest whether the 
evidence Webster now seeks to present was indeed unavailable to 
                                                 
180
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1141.  
181
 Id.  
182
 Id.  
183
 Id. at 1146.  
184
 Id. at 1141.  
185
 Id. at 1140. 
186
 Id. at 1141.  
187
 Id. at 1133.  
188
 Id. at 1140.  
189
 Id. at 1145. 
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Webster and his counsel at the initial trial.
190
 Webster’s counsel argued 
that its pre-trial request for these records went unanswered.
191
 The 
government, on the other argued that any failure to receive the records 
was attributable to Webster’s counsel.192 In any event, it is currently 
unknown to the court whether Webster’s counsel ever followed up 
with the Social Security Administration on his records request or if the 
Administration deliberately or accidentally failed to provide these 
records.
193
 In light of this uncertainty, the Seventh Circuit decided to 
remand the case to the district court to resolve these issues of fact.
194
 If 
the district court determined that the records were unavailable and all 
reasonable diligence was exercised by counsel to obtain them, then 
Webster’s habeas corpus petition will be decided on the strength of his 
evidence.
195
 
 
C.  The Dissenting Opinion in Webster v. Daniels 
 
The dissent’s opinion of the majority’s holding in Webster v. 
Daniels can effectively be summed up by one short sentence: “The 
majority concluded that Section 2255 provides inadequate or 
ineffective relief to Webster simply because it prevents Webster from 
presenting the particular argument he now wants to make.”196 Indeed, 
the dissent, in an opinion authored by Judge Easterbrook, vehemently 
argued that the majority does not provide sufficient legal justification 
for its invocation of the Savings Clause.
197
  
The dissent first attacked the textual analysis offered by the 
majority.
198
 Recall that the majority argued that the language of the 
                                                 
190
 Id. at 1146.  
191
 Id. at 1142. 
192
 Id. at 1141.  
193
 Id. at 1142.  
194
 Id. at 1146.  
195
 Id.  
196
 Id. at 1148 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
197
 See id. at 1147–52.  
198
 See id. at 1150.  
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statute supports the application of the Savings Clause to challenge an 
unlawful sentence.
199
 The dissent recognized that the language of 
Section 2255 as a whole covers convictions as well as sentences, but 
questions how this language “justifies using [the Savings Clause] to 
escape from § 2255 altogether?”200 Certainly, Webster was able to, and 
did, in fact, use Section 2255 to make an argument that he is 
constitutionally ineligible for capital punishment.
201
 The fact that this 
argument was rejected on the merits does not, by itself, render Section 
2255 “inadequate or ineffective.”202 
The dissent then calls into question the majority’s reliance on 
Atkins v. Virginia.
203
 The dissent contended that Atkins did not alter the 
substantive standard set forth by 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c), in effect at the 
time Webster was sentenced to death.
204
 Indeed, the statute made it 
unlawful to impose the death penalty upon a person suffering from a 
mental disability.
205
 The Supreme Court, in Atkins, later held that the 
Constitution establishes this same rule.
206
 Thus, according to the 
dissent, there is no basis for another round of collateral review when 
the substantive rule is unchanged.
207
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
This Part will argue that the Seventh Circuit incorrectly decided 
Webster v. Daniels. In support of this conclusion, I will first argue that 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision to allow Webster to file a successive 
habeas corpus petition is not supported by relevant Seventh Circuit 
precedent. I will then argue that the justifications offered by the 
                                                 
199
 Id. at 1138 (majority opinion).  
200
 Id. at 1150 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).  
201
 Id.  
202
 Id.  
203
 Id.  
204
 Id.  
205
 See 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c).  
206
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1147 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).  
207
 Id. at 1151.  
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Seventh Circuit are inadequate to invoke the Savings Clause in 
Webster’s case. Finally, I will argue that the Seventh Circuit’s opinion 
raises significant policy concerns; indeed, the decision is contrary to 
the objective of 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  
 
A.  The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion in Webster v. Daniels is not 
supported by relevant Savings Clause jurisprudence. 
 
The Seventh Circuit has developed a body of case law discussing 
circumstances that justify the application of the Savings Clause. This 
body of case law indicates that the Seventh Circuit has only invoked 
the Savings Clause when the remedy provided by Section 2255 is 
inadequate or ineffective as a result of a structural problem created by 
the statute itself.
208
  
The Seventh Circuit identified this type of structural problem in 
Davenport, where the prisoner sought to rely on a new statutory 
interpretation made retroactive by the Supreme Court.
209
 This new 
interpretation would have allowed the prisoner to establish innocence 
of the underlying crime for which he was convicted.
210
 However, the 
prisoner was barred from challenging the legality of his sentence under 
Section 2255.
211
 He had already utilized his initial Section 2255 
motion and was unable to satisfy either of the requirements necessary 
to obtain certification of a successive motion under Section 2255(h), 
as the statute only allows new rules of constitutional law (not statutory 
law) to be presented for certification.
212
 Consequently, the prisoner 
was without the ability to obtain a remedy under Section 2255, even 
though a Supreme Court decision binding on federal courts would 
have granted him relief.
213
 In other words, the prisoner was unable to 
obtain the habeas corpus relief to which he was entitled because of a 
                                                 
208
 See id. at 1136 (majority opinion).  
209
 In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 1998).  
210
 Id.  
211
 Id. at 607.  
212
 Id. at 610.  
213
 See id.  
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defect in the structure of Section 2255. To cure this deficiency, the 
Seventh Circuit permitted the prisoner to bring a habeas corpus 
petition under Section 2241.
214
 
The Seventh Circuit recognized the existence of a similar 
structural problem in Brown v. Caraway. In this case, the prisoner was 
convicted of drug and weapons charges, and classified as a “career 
offender” under mandatory sentencing guidelines.215 A higher sentence 
was imposed as a result of this classification.
216
 The prisoner 
unsuccessfully challenged his sentence under Section 2255.
217
 After 
this motion was denied, the Supreme Court decided Begay v. U.S.;
218
 
this case offered a new interpretation of the sentencing guidelines.
219
 
The prisoner then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Seventh 
Circuit pursuant to Section 2241, arguing that under Begay, he could 
not be classified as a career offender, and accordingly, his sentence 
should be reduced.
220
  
The Seventh Circuit authorized the prisoner to pursue a habeas 
petition under Section 2241.
221
 The court acknowledged that without 
resorting to Section 2241, the prisoner would be unable to obtain 
relief.
222
 The prisoner would not be afforded relief under Section 2255 
because he had already exhausted his initial Section 2255 motion.
223
 
Additionally, any request for a successive motion under Section 
2255(h) would have been denied because the prisoner did not seek to 
present newly discovered evidence of his innocence, or rely on a new 
constitutional ruling.
224
 Yet again, the structural confines of 
                                                 
214
 Id. at 610–12. 
215
 Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 585 (7th Cir. 2013).  
216
 Id.  
217
 Id.  
218
 533 U.S. 137 (2008). 
219
 Brown, 719 F.3d at 586.  
220
 Id.  
221
 Id.  
222
 Id. 
223
 See id. at 585.  
224
 See id. at 586. 
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Section 2255 prevented the prisoner from obtaining habeas relief. The 
Seventh Circuit recognized this limitation, and accordingly, allowed 
resort to Section 2241.  
Both of these decisions indicate that “there must be some kind of 
structural problem with Section 2255 before Section 2241 becomes 
available.”225 That is, “something more than a lack of success with a 
section 2255 must exist before the savings clause is satisfied.”226 
While the Seventh Circuit acknowledged this binding precedent in 
Webster v. Daniels, the court failed to abide by it in reaching its 
decision. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit did not and cannot justify 
invocation of the Savings Clause in Webster’s case on the basis of a 
structural problem inherent in Section 2255. Webster did not assert a 
claim of innocence of the underlying crime based on a change in the 
law, like the defendant in Davenport.
227
 Nor did Webster contend that 
a change in the law entitles him to a reduced sentence.
228
 Rather, 
Webster sought to present “newly” discovered evidence of his mental 
competency that would allegedly demonstrate ineligibility for the 
death penalty.
229
 Webster contended that this evidence, though in 
existence at the time of trial, was not made available to him, despite a 
request by his attorney.
230
 Webster thus argued that a Section 2241 
petition was necessary in order to remedy this problem.
231
 
However, any problem with obtaining this evidence prior to trial, 
by the Seventh Circuit’s own admission, is attributable to either the 
custodian of the records or Webster’s attorneys, not the structure of 
Section 2255.
232
  Wherever the fault lies, Section 2255 provides an 
adequate remedy.  Indeed, if Webster’s former counsel is to blame, 
relief under Section 2255 is available on the grounds of ineffective 
                                                 
225
 Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015). 
226
 Id.  
227
 See In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 1998). 
228
 See Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2013). 
229
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1132.  
230
 Id. at 1133.  
231
 See id.  
232
 See id. at 1142. 
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assistance of counsel.
233
 In fact, the most common issue raised in a 
Section 2255 motion is ineffective assistance of counsel.
234
 Section 
2255 also provides prisoners with an effective means of claiming that 
material evidence has been withheld in violation of Brady v. 
Maryland.
235
 Circuit courts hear and resolve these types of claims 
under Section 2255 frequently.
236
 Webster could have raised either of 
these arguments on his initial Section 2255 motion.
237
 Certainly, 
Webster’s attorneys would have known in 2005, when the initial 
Section 2255 petition was made, that records requested in 1998 were 
never received.
238
 The fact that Webster failed to present these 
arguments on an earlier motion, though unfortunate, does not justify 
giving him the opportunity to do so now. After all, pursuant to the 
Savings Clause, “an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf 
of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief pursuant to this 
section shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has 
failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced 
him.”239  
Accordingly, the Savings Clause cannot be applied to allow a 
prisoner to make up for his own (or in all likelihood, his counsel’s) 
lack of diligence. There must be a structural problem that would 
foreclose collateral review under Section 2255.
240
 The Seventh Circuit, 
however, did not follow its own precedent when it decided Webster v. 
Daniels. The court decided to apply a far broader interpretation of the 
Savings Clause than that contained in Davenport and its progeny 
without any real justification for doing so.  
                                                 
233
 See id. at 1151 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); see also INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: APPEAL, 16A FED. PROC., L. ED. § 41.445 (2015). 
234
 Ellen Henak, When the Interests of Self, Clients and Colleagues Collide: 
The Ethics of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
347, 347 (2009).  
235
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1151 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).  
236
 Id.  
237
 Id.  
238
 Id.  
239
 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (emphasis added).  
240
 Taylor v. Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2013).  
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B.  The Seventh Circuit does not offer sufficient legal justification for 
applying the Savings Clause in Webster v. Daniels. 
 
The Seventh Circuit set forth two justifications in support of its 
holding that the Savings Clause permits Webster to file a habeas 
corpus petition pursuant to Section 2241. I will explore the validity of 
these justifications in the following section, ultimately concluding that 
these justifications fail to support the application of the Savings Clause 
in Webster v. Daniels.  
 
1.  The language of the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 does not justify application 
of the Savings Clause in Webster v. Daniels. 
 
The first justification is that the language of the statute itself 
allows Webster to bring a traditional habeas corpus petition.
241
 The 
Seventh Circuit contended that Section 2255 is the vehicle whereby 
federal prisoners may challenge both their sentences and underlying 
convictions.
242
 The Savings Clause, specifically, focuses on the 
legality of the prisoner’s detention243 and, therefore, applies when the 
remedy provided by Section 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test 
the legality of [a prisoner’s] detention.”244 That is, the Savings Clause 
may be invoked to allow a federal prisoner to file a writ of habeas 
corpus under Section 2241 even if the prisoner only wishes to 
challenge his sentence. 
However, it is hardly a novel concept that challenges to a prison 
sentence (rather than just the underlying conviction) can be brought 
under Section 2241. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has previously 
applied the Savings Clause to allow a federal prisoner to attack his 
sentence under Section 2241.
245
 In fact, the Seventh Circuit has 
                                                 
241
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1138 (majority opinion).  
242
 Id.  
243
 Id. 
244
 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).  
245
 See Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2013). 
29
Evans: Post-Conviction Relief: The Seventh Circuit Applies Savings Claus
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2015
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 11, Issue 1                            Fall 2015 
 
87 
 
explicitly stated that the Savings Clause may be used to attack the 
legality of a prison sentence.
246
 So, while in Webster the Seventh 
Circuit correctly states that the Savings Clause allows federal 
prisoners to challenge the legality of their sentences, all the court has 
done is reiterate a familiar holding. The Seventh Circuit did not offer a 
compelling reason why the Savings Clause should be applied to allow 
Mr. Webster, or prisoners like him, to resort to a petition under Section 
2241. The court only stated that the Savings Clause allows for 
collateral review of a federal sentence under Section 2241. This 
statement alone cannot justify application of the Savings Clause.  
 
2.  The Savings Clause cannot be invoked to present a constitutional 
argument that was previously heard and decided on them  
merits. 
 
The Seventh Circuit secondarily relies on the fact that Atkins v. 
Virginia was decided after Webster was convicted and sentenced to 
death to support its application of the Savings Clause in Webster v. 
Daniels.
247
 Recall that in Atkins, the Supreme Court established that 
the Constitution forbids the execution of mentally disabled persons.
248
 
It is the Seventh Circuit’s contention that because Webster did not 
have the benefit of arguing that he was constitutionally ineligible for 
the death penalty under Atkins at his sentencing and on direct appeal, 
he should be able to do so now.
249
 This argument would certainly be 
persuasive if Webster never had the opportunity to argue categorical 
ineligibility pursuant to Atkins, but he did.  
After all, Webster made the exact same argument in his initial 
Section 2255 motion, and it was rejected by the Fifth Circuit on the 
grounds that there was little difference between the governing 
standards in 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) and the Constitution.
250
 Indeed, the 
                                                 
246
 Id.  
247
 Webster, 784 F.3d at 1138–39. 
248
 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
249
 See Webster, 784 F.3d at 1139. 
250
 Id. at 1132. 
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Fifth Circuit stated that “[t]he only substantive change ushered in by 
Atkins with respect to federal capital [prisoners] is the recognition of a 
new source of federal law (i.e. constitutional) that bars their 
execution.”251 Thus, the trial court’s decision that Webster was an 
eligible candidate for the death penalty under 18 U.S.C. § 3596 
applied with equal force under Atkins; that is, a different result was not 
warranted due to the decision in Atkins.
252
  
However, the Seventh Circuit seemed to forget this relevant 
procedural history. Instead, the court invoked Atkins to give Webster 
another bite at the apple, without any explanation as to why Atkins 
justified the filing of a successive collateral attack. This decision begs 
the question: why should Webster get another chance to present the 
same argument he presented to the Fifth Circuit, an argument in which 
he received a decision on the merits by the Fifth Circuit?
253
 
Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit did concede that the Savings 
Clause would not apply if Atkins had never been decided.
254
 According 
to the majority, the argument that Webster now has new evidence that 
would demonstrate that a federal statute (i.e., Section 3596(c)) would 
be violated by his execution would not be enough to trigger the 
Savings Clause.
255
 Yet, the Seventh Circuit nevertheless asserted that 
Atkins, which sets forth the same legal standard codified in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3596(c), justifies subsequent collateral review in Webster’s case. 
These statements yield a conflicting conclusion.  
The Seventh Circuit attempted to alleviate this confusion in a 
footnote, in which it is explained that “collateral review is primarily 
used for constitutional violations, not violations of federal law that . . . 
should be raised on direct appeal.”256 With this statement, the Seventh 
Circuit seems to have suggested that collateral review of a prison 
sentence is justified when the sentence is imposed in violation of the 
                                                 
251
 United States v. Webster, 421 F.3d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 2005).  
252
 Id. 
253
 See Webster, 784 F.3d at 1151 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
254
 Id. at 1139 (majority opinion).  
255
 Id. 
256
 Id. at 1139 n.6. 
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Constitution, but not when the sentence is imposed in violation of a 
federal law. However, this explanation only serves to cause further 
confusion because the language of the statute—the bedrock of the 
Seventh Circuit’s primary justification for application of the Savings 
Clause in Webster’s case—provides that a federal prisoner may 
challenge his sentence under Section 2255 if it was imposed in 
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.
257
 So, it 
would seem that the statute itself does not recognize a difference 
between those collateral attacks made pursuant to the Constitution and 
those made pursuant to federal statute, which begs the question: why 
should the Seventh Circuit make such a distinction? 
 
C.  The precedent set by Webster v. Daniels will lead to results that are 
contrary to the intent of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Webster v. Daniels should 
be rejected on policy grounds. Indeed, the decision to allow Webster to 
file a successive collateral review in the Seventh Circuit directly 
conflicts with the intended purpose of Section 2255. Recall that 
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to solve venue problems created 
by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, which required a federal prisoner 
to file his writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court with 
jurisdiction over his place of confinement.
258
 This venue requirement 
flooded those federal courts whose jurisdiction included federal 
prisons with numerous habeas corpus petitions.
259
 It also created a 
“physical-proximity problem” since federal courts with habeas 
jurisdiction were often a substantial distance from the relevant 
witnesses and evidence.
260
 Section 2255 was intended “to disperse the 
caseload associated with collateral attacks and to ensure that post-
conviction proceedings were conducted closer to the relevant records 
and witnesses” by requiring federal prisoners to challenge their 
                                                 
257
 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (emphasis added).  
258
 Case, supra note 30, at 175.  
259
 Id. 
260
 Id. at 176. 
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sentences in the court which imposed that sentence.
261
 In addition to 
“matching the litigation with the court possessing the record,” Section 
2255 also “ensures that only one court of appeals will be involved.”262 
However, the Seventh Circuit seems to undermine these 
objectives by allowing Webster to seek habeas corpus relief in the 
jurisdiction of his incarceration. So, not only does Webster potentially 
have another opportunity to challenge his death sentence, he also has 
the added benefit of challenging it in a new jurisdiction, one that has 
already proven favorable to him. This is particularly problematic for 
several reasons. First, as indicated by the dissent, the Seventh Circuit 
is home to the only federal correctional facility housing death row 
inmates.
263
 As a result, all habeas corpus petitions brought pursuant to 
Section 2241 (by virtue of Savings Clause application) will be heard 
by the Seventh Circuit.
264
 This effectively gives the Seventh Circuit 
“final say about the propriety of every federal death sentence.”265 Is it 
wise to create a system in which one circuit is deciding the fate of all 
death row inmates? 
Relatedly, the decision in Webster may also facilitate conflict 
among federal circuits.
266
 After all, due to application of the Savings 
Clause in Webster, a district court in the Seventh Circuit will now be 
reviewing a case that was previously considered by the Fifth Circuit. 
This opens the door for circuit courts to contradict each other in the 
same case.
267
 One must ask whether it is prudent to adopt a policy 
whereby circuit courts have the ability to undermine the decisions of 
their sister circuits. Such a policy may lead to invocation of the 
Savings Clause in order to procure a more “favorable” circuit. It may 
also create bad blood among the circuits, especially if the Seventh 
                                                 
261
 Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 
262
 Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1147 (7th Cir. 2015) (Easterbrook, J., 
dissenting).  
263
 Id. at 1149. 
264
 Id. 
265
 Id.  
266
 Id. at 1147. 
267
 See id.  
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Circuit has final review over all habeas petitions, even those that 
originated in other circuits. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
An interest in the finality of judgment in the criminal process has 
led to limited post-conviction relief. Indeed, prisoners seeking to 
challenge the legality of their sentences or convictions only have one 
opportunity to do so as a matter of right under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The 
Savings Clause is oftentimes the only recourse for a federal prisoner 
who seeks to obtain subsequent collateral review of his sentence or 
conviction. The Seventh Circuit has historically interpreted this Clause 
to allow successive collateral review for federal prisoners only when a 
structural problem inherent in the statute forecloses effective review. 
However, the Seventh Circuit significantly and unjustifiably 
broadened this interpretation with its decision in Webster v. Daniels. In 
Webster, the Seventh Circuit applied the Savings Clause to allow a 
federal prisoner to pursue a successive collateral attack on his death 
sentence on the basis that “newly discovered” evidence would render 
the sentence unconstitutional. This conclusion is inconsistent with 
relevant Seventh Circuit Savings Clause jurisprudence; is not 
supported by sufficient legal justification; and is contrary to the 
purpose and objective of the Savings Clause. 
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